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“ ‘What decides wars is what starts them—politics.’ ”1  
“The great play of sovereignty, with all its pomp and panoply, can 
now be seen for what it hides: a posturing troupe of human actors, 
who when off-stage are sometimes prone to rape the chorus.”2 
 Sovereignty rests at the core of debates over the validity of hu-
manitarian intervention in situations of grave crisis and loss of life. 
All too frequently, opponents of sovereignty use the concept to halt 
international action aimed at stopping or lessening human suffering 
in a sovereign state. Sovereignty as a blockade, however, is an in-
complete understanding of the doctrine. While sovereignty protects 
the right of a nation to exist and govern itself, proponents of the Re-
sponsibility to Protect (hereinafter RTP) as a norm of international 
law recognize that sovereignty entails the responsibility to protect 
populations from human rights abuses. Finding its grounding in mul-
tiple international treaties and the concept of sovereignty itself, the 
RTP doctrine makes strides in overcoming the non-intervention 
norm. As a non-binding norm, however, RTP cannot overcome a sec-
ond common block to intervention: lack of political will. To ensure 
                                                 
 ∗  J.D., 2011, Magna Cum Laude, Florida State University College of Law; MSc, 
2007 with merit in Social Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science; 
A.B., 2006, Magna Cum Laude with High Honors in Anthropology, Davidson College.  I 
would like to thank Professor Lesley Wexler for her guidance and feedback during the writ-
ing process.  My thanks also go to Seth Welner and Jon Harris Maurer at Florida State 
University Law Review for all their hard work. 
 1. William Langewiesche, The Distant Executioner, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2010, at 94, 
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2010/02/sniper-201002 (quoting Mar-
tin Pegler, a preeminent warfare scholar). As discussed infra, political will is a significant 
block to international intervention in conflicts which threaten human rights.  
 2. State sovereignty and non-intervention exist alongside political will as significant 
blocks to intervention. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 399 (2d ed. 2002). 
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international action will proceed in the face of grave human rights 
abuses, scholars and proponents of RTP must better delimit the doc-
trine and transition RTP to a binding principle of international law, 
as well as advocate for reform of the U.N. Security Council veto power.   
I.   HONORING THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 Following General Augusto Pinochet’s 1998 arrest, the British 
House of Lords, over the course of three decisions, addressed the 
question of whether Pinochet, as a head of state, could be legally re-
sponsible for torture and similar crimes against humanity perpe-
trated under his rule.3 The case presented a high profile opportunity 
to address the issue of sovereign immunity4—an issue courts had yet 
to fully explore due to nations’ reticence to prosecute other heads of 
state.5 Ultimately, the House of Lords “confirmed the trend [started 
at] Nuremberg,”6 finding that sovereign immunity does not shield 
responsibility for crimes against humanity.7 Human rights scholar 
and lawyer Geoffrey Robertson identifies one key aspect of the deci-
sion that goes beyond its precedential value for issues of sovereign 
immunity: “[the] conclusion [is] a striking example of a court taking a 
treaty not just at its word but (in the absence of express words) at its 
spirit.”8 The Pinochet court refused to yield to the unspoken truth of 
“cynical diplomacy”9: the concept that many nations sign treaties for 
public relations more than out of the intent to be bound to the 
treaty’s substance.10 Rather, the court “took the Torture Convention 
to mean what it said”11: for torturers, no matter what position they 
hold or how immune they may have believed themselves to be, there 
is “no safe haven.”12   
 RTP—the concept that a nation is responsible for protecting its 
citizens from atrocities within its borders and that its failure to do so 
opens the door to international intervention13—presents an opportu-
                                                 
 3. Id. at 393-95, 414-18.  
 4. See id. at 414, 417.  
 5. Id. at 395 (“Never before had a former head of state, visiting another friendly 
country, been held legally amenable to its criminal process.”).  
 6. Id. at 421.  
 7. Id. at 420-21.  
 8. Id. at 421. 
 9. Id. at 422. 
 10. See id. at 422. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 421. 
 13. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT xi (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp [hereinafter ICISS 
REPORT] (asserting that “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary respon-
sibility for the protection of its people lies within the state itself. . . .  Where a population is 
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or state failure, 
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”). 
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nity to do for humanitarian intervention what the Pinochet cases did 
for the concept of sovereign liability for crimes against humanity. In 
Pinochet, the principle treaty at issue was the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
(CAT).14 Article 1 of the Convention defines torture as:  
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instiga-
tion of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.15    
If the U.K. court interpreted the CAT as leaving sovereign immunity 
unaltered, it would have arrived at the following “self-defeating syl-
logism: Only public officials can commit torture. Public officials are 
immune from prosecution. Nobody can ever be prosecuted for tor-
ture.”16 Rejecting this outcome, the court advanced the CAT by com-
ing to the only decision that could uphold both the words and the 
core meaning of the treaty: that sovereign immunity did not survive 
the ratification of the CAT.17   
 RTP draws its strength from even richer ground than that of sov-
ereign liability: the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions and its Additional 
Protocols, the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the concept of sover-
eignty itself.18 How lawyers and policymakers delimit and implement 
RTP in the coming years will influence whether the international 
community will continue to advance the spirit, as well as the letter, 
of these documents, or whether it will stand idly by as the next 
Rwanda, Darfur, or Congo unfolds.  
 In its current form, RTP succeeds in addressing one of the princi-
ple blocks to intervention—the non-intervention norm. The non-
                                                 
 14. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 421. 
 15. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
art. 1, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20,1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (emphasis added). 
 16. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 419. 
 17. Id. at 419-21. 
 18. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, para. 2.26; HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
Involvement of Sudanese Security Personnel in Attacks on the Bulbul Area of South Darfur 
from January to March 2007, 10 (May 18, 2007), available at www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/ 
Countries/7thOHCHR18may07.doc (identifying the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights as a foundation for a nation’s responsibility to protect its citizens). 
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intervention norm is the concept that sovereignty demands foreign 
nations refrain from interjecting themselves into the domestic affairs 
of another nation.19 This success aside, RTP’s status as a non-binding 
norm does little to address the other principle block to international 
intervention in humanitarian crises—lack of political will. Scholars 
and policymakers have laid the foundation, but RTP requires further 
work. To succeed in preventing future atrocities—to honor the spirit 
and letter of foundational international law—RTP must transition 
from a non-binding norm to a binding principle of international law. 
The proposals of this Note combine existing U.N. action on RTP, the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) proposals, and scholarship on intervention to construct an 
RTP doctrine which is broad enough to be effective while narrow 
enough to be adopted by the international community.   
II.   PRINCIPLE BARS TO INTERVENTION 
A.   Sovereignty and the Non-Intervention Norm 
 Sovereignty lends itself to multiple definitions. Less cynical schol-
ars define it as:  
the notion that in every system of government there must be some 
absolute power of final decision . . . . [It is] the legal identity of the 
state in international law, an equality of status with all other 
states, and the claim to be the sole official agent acting in interna-
tional relations on behalf of a society.20 
Others view the doctrine more cynically, defining it as “the doctrine 
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nation states asserted by 
all governments which have refused to subject the treatment they 
mete out to their citizens to any independent external scrutiny.”21 
Sovereignty is, in part, a relational concept, as nations must respect 
the sovereign status of other nations for the system to flourish.22 Re-
gardless of how scholars define the concept, however, it is a founda-
tion of international law and domestic governance.23 Advocates of 
RTP ground the doctrine in the concept that sovereignty does not 
confer only power, but also responsibility.24 However, nations and 
policymakers interpreting sovereignty have not always been as simi-
larly progressive as RTP advocates. 
                                                 
 19. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx. 
 20. Ramesh Thakur, In Defence of the Responsibility to Protect, 7 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 
160, 165 (2003). 
 21. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx. 
 22. Thakur, supra note 20, at 166 (“A condition of any one state’s sovereignty is a 
corresponding obligation to respect every other state’s sovereignty.”). 
 23. See id. at 165-66. 
 24. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi; see Thakur, supra note 20, at 165-66. 
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 Until recently, the international community largely understood 
the non-intervention norm to be the necessary corollary to sover-
eignty.25 Non-intervention essentially requires that one nation not 
interfere with the sovereign, domestic affairs of another nation.26 The 
U.N. Charter reifies the concept in Article 2(7)27:  
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially with-
in the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Mem-
bers to submit such matters to settlement under the present Char-
ter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of en-
forcement measures under Chapter VII.28 
Even advocates of RTP emphasize the continued importance of non-
intervention to maintaining international stability.29 However, as 
discussed infra, the RTP doctrine recognizes the non-intervention 
norm without granting it the power to paralyze international re-
sponse to atrocities within a sovereign state.30 
 Lord Millet, who heard the Pinochet cases, cautioned against fet-
ishizing31 sovereignty so as to make it a cloak concealing all manner 
of sins of the sovereign. Only a few years after the landmark Pinochet 
decisions, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan echoed Lord Millet’s 
warning. Noting the difficulties of answering when and how humani-
tarian intervention should proceed, Annan emphatically asserted 
that “surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield 
crimes against humanity.”32 RTP, as a doctrine, both expresses 
agreement with Annan’s statement and provides a means of ensuring 
that those who would fetishize sovereignty will no longer dominate 
the discussion on international responsibility in the face of atrocities.  
B.   Weak or Absent Political Will 
 The current Secretary-General of the U.N., Ban Ki-moon of the 
Republic of Korea, found the recent crisis in Darfur to have “high-
lighted how inadequate our policy tools are and how fleeting is the 
                                                 
 25. See William R. Pace & Nicole Deller, Preventing Future Genocides: An Interna-
tional Responsibility to Protect, 36 WORLD ORDER 15, 16-17 (2005). See also Thakur, supra 
note 20, at 165. 
 26. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; see ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx; Thakur, supra 
note 20, at 165.  
 27. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, para 2.8. 
 28. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
 29. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, paras. 2.7-2.8. 
 30. Id. paras. 4.10-4.14. The report asserts that nations have a “responsibility to react 
to situations of compelling need for human protection.” Id. para. 4.1.  This responsibility 
logically requires a “departure” from the non-intervention norm. Id. para. 4.11. 
 31. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 420 (footnote omitted).  
 32. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
Twenty-First Century, ¶ 219, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/54/2000 (Mar. 
27, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples].  
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political will to use them.”33 Scholars advocating RTP nearly univer-
sally recognize lack of political will as a plague that cripples any 
chance of intervention in humanitarian crises.34 This plague is par-
ticularly virulent when it squelches political will of the U.S.35 and the 
other four permanent members of the Security Council (China, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Russia) because of their veto power to 
halt Security Council action.36 Perhaps more than any other single 
factor, political will, by its presence or absence, determines whether 
the international community will intervene in a foreign crisis.37 
 States are inconsistent in mustering political will to intervene in 
crisis or punish their perpetrators.38 Liberal, legalist states—nations 
which believe in the protection of individual civil and political rights 
through the legal system39—like the U.S., exist in constant tension 
between the “push-and-pull of idealism and selfishness.”40 This ideal-
ism, which both the government and the popular conscience of their 
citizenry hold, embraces the concept that there are “[u]niversal hu-
man rights [which] do not respect ‘geographical morality’ or sover-
eignty.”41 A liberal state’s idealism, however, repeatedly conflicts 
with the nation’s self-interest.42 As an outgrowth of this self-interest, 
nations consistently hesitate to intervene in a foreign conflict unless 
they themselves have been harmed.43 This self-interest squelches po-
litical will, particularly when a nation’s citizens are ambivalent about 
a conflict.44 Scholars note that it is not wholly surprising “that even 
liberal states value the lives of their own more than those of foreign-
ers, but [surprising] how radically the lives of foreigners are dis-
                                                 
 33. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 59, deliv-
ered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Secre-
tary-General, Implementing] (emphasis added). 
 34. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, paras. 8.1-8.24; see also Rebecca J. Hamil-
ton, Recent Development, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But 
What of Implementation? 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 294 (2006).  
 35. Samantha Power, Raising the Cost of Genocide, in THE NEW KILLING FIELDS: 
MASSACRE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION 245, 260 (Nicolaus Mills & Kira Brunner, 
eds., 2002)  (“Without U.S. leadership, the last century showed, others will be unwilling to 
step forward to act and genocide will continue.”). 
 36. Amnesty Int’l, UN: Governments Must Act Promptly and Effectively on Important 
Human Rights Commitments in 2005 World Summit Document, AI Index IOR 41/062/2005 
(Sept. 26, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR41/062/2005. 
 37. See Power, supra note 35, at 256; SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL:” 
AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 508-10 (2003). 
 38. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 5-8 (2001) (focusing his work on explaining the inconsistencies of inter-
national support for war crimes tribunals). 
 39. Id. at 20-23. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. Id. at 22. 
 42. See id. at 8, 29-32. 
 43. See id. at 276 (“The single best guarantee of a stung and moralistic reaction from 
a liberal state has been its own victimization.”). 
 44. Id. at 28-32. 
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counted,”45 in light of the idealistic principles of such nations.46 A 
proposal for a binding RTP must build upon the idealism of liberal, 
legalist states and be structured to prevent the inherent selfishness 
of states from winning the day. 
C.   Rwanda: A Failure of Political Will 
 Critics of the international community’s failure to prevent atroci-
ties frequently look to the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.47 It stands as a 
profoundly chilling example of the devastating effects of inaction.48 
Rwanda is a small, densely-populated country in East Africa whose 
pre-genocide population was between 7 and 8 million.49 During its 
colonial occupation, Belgium reified what had been fluid ethnic 
boundaries, “racializ[ing]” the three ethnic groups: Tutsi, Hutu and 
Twa.50 Before the Genocide, the Tutsi constituted approximately fif-
teen percent of the population, making Hutu the dominant ethnic 
identity.51 In the span of one hundred days, beginning on April 6, 
1994, the Interahamwe (a Hutu militia) and the Hutu-dominated 
Rwandan Army murdered at least 800,000 Tutsi and “politically 
moderate Hutu.”52 All the while, the international community 
watched from afar what “would prove to be the fastest, most efficient 
killing spree of the twentieth century.”53 
 The Rwandan Genocide provides a devastating case study of the 
international community’s failure to muster political will. Then Re-
publican Senator Bob Dole made a telling statement regarding 
whether the U.S. should intervene: “I don’t think we have any na-
tional interest there . . . . The Americans are out, and as far as I am 
concerned, in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it.”54 Selfishness 
defeated idealism. Though the international community had exten-
sive intelligence on what was occurring,55 it simply fell in step with 
                                                 
 45. Id. at 29. 
 46. See id. at 21-29. 
 47. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32, at ¶ 217 (“But to 
the critics [of humanitarian intervention] I would pose this question: if humanitarian in-
tervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a 
Rwanda . . . to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of 
our common humanity?”). 
 48. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Lessons Learned Ten Years After the 
Genocide (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/29/rwanda8308.htm. 
 49. Luc De Huesch, Rwanda: Responsibilities for a Genocide, 11 ANTHROPOLOGY 
TODAY 3, 6  (1995). 
 50. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, 
AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 87-88 (2001). 
 51. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 29 (1998). 
 52. POWER, supra note 37, at 329-35.  
 53. Id. at 334.  
 54. Id. at 352. 
 55. Id. at 338-39, 354-55, 504-06. 
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the U.S., which refused to even label the situation genocide.56 While 
the U.S. called for a full withdrawal from Rwanda, ultimately the 
U.N. kept a paltry and ineffective UNAMIR force of 270 troops in 
Rwanda.57 The American public did not call for action, so the U.S. 
government spearheaded the campaign for apathy, and won.58  
 After the Genocide, the international community searched for ex-
planations and made apologies.59 Then Secretary-General Annan 
commissioned an inquiry into Rwanda to attempt to explain how the 
international community could have ignored the atrocity.60 The 
Commission came to a simple conclusion: “The failure of the United 
Nations . . . to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the 
United Nations system as a whole . . . . There was a persistent lack of 
political will by the Member States to act, or to act with enough as-
sertiveness.”61 Political will was determinative in Rwanda. A binding 
RTP doctrine can ensure that a lack of political will does not permit 
another Rwanda by mandating action for certain international crimes. 
III.   RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: DEFINING THE DOCTRINE 
 While many have addressed the question of whether humanitar-
ian interventions are morally, legally, or pragmatically justified, this 
Note seeks to determine how to galvanize existing support for and 
delimit the boundaries of RTP as an avenue to intervention. Still, a 
brief discussion of why the international community should intervene 
provides necessary background to an analysis of RTP. The reasons to 
intervene are straightforward: moral principles and the simple, 
pragmatic reality that doing so saves lives.   
                                                 
 56. See MOHAMED C. OTHMAN, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW VIOLATIONS: THE CASE OF RWANDA AND EAST TIMOR 33-34 (2005); see also POWER, 
supra note 37, at 359 (“American officials again shunned the g-word. They were afraid that 
using it would have obliged the United States to act under the terms of the 1948 genocide 
convention . . . . A discussion paper on Rwanda, prepared by an official in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense . . . testifies to the nature of official thinking[;] . . . ‘Be Careful. Legal 
at State was worried about this yesterday–Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. gov-
ernment] to actually ‘do something.’ ”).  
 57. POWER, supra note 37, at 369. 
 58. See id. at 373. The detrimental impact of the American public’s apathy exemplifies 
how the public’s ambivalence fuels a nation’s selfishness and therein prevents intervention. 
BASS, supra note 38, at 28-32. 
 59. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 37, at 386 (“With the grace of one grown practiced at 
public remorse, [Clinton] issues something of an apology. ‘We in the United States and the 
world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit 
what occurred . . . .’ ”). 
 60. See generally U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the 
Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 3, U.N. Doc. 
S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999). 
 61. Id. 
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 Whether based in a complex moral code or grounded in “simple 
decency,”62 the fact that thousands and sometimes millions of indi-
viduals are killed, tortured, or otherwise degraded and denied fun-
damental human rights demands action. Rwanda is sufficient proof 
of the atrocities man perpetrates, which “offend every precept of our 
common humanity” and which the international community must not 
ignore.63 Beyond the moral weight in favor of action, the efficacy of 
past interventions supports future action.64 The last-act NATO inter-
vention into Kosovo saved as many as 1.7 million Albanians from 
persecution.65 Even in Rwanda, the miniscule U.N. force saved the 
lives of 25,000 Rwandans.66 Intervention is thus, both an effective 
tool, as well a moral endeavor.67 RTP doctrine advances both the 
moral and practical goals of intervention. 
A.  Foundations of RTP 
 As early as 1988 the international community recognized a theo-
retical forerunner to RTP in the Velásquez Rodríguez case.68 The In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights heard the case, which raised 
the issue of Honduras’s state liability for detaining and causing the 
disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez.69 Ultimately, 
the court found that Honduras violated Articles 4 (right to life), 5 
(right to humane treatment), and 7 (right to personal liberty) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.70 Most importantly for RTP, 
the court recognized that a state has a duty of due diligence to per-
sons within its borders.71 Specifically, a state, even if it does not 
commit the violation of rights in question, has a duty of “due dili-
gence to prevent the violation or to respond to it.”72 The court found 
the due diligence principle in the obligation each State has under Ar-
                                                 
 62. Michael Walzer, Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention, in THE NEW KILLING 
FIELDS: MASSACRE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION, supra note 35, at 19, 21. 
 63. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32 at ¶¶ 217-19. 
 64. Power, supra note 35, at 255. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Critics of intervention argue that states will use the concept to engage in pretex-
tual humanitarian interventions in the name of more selfish aims or that interventions are 
too costly, ineffective, or inconsistent. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 
32, at ¶ 216 (citing frequent objections to intervention). The proposals of this paper seek to 
address those concerns by further defining RTP. A full discussion of these arguments is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of such arguments and their 
counter-arguments, see Ken Roth, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2004 - War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention, (JANUARY 1, 2004), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/402ba99f4.pdf. 
 68. See generally Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, (July 29, 1988). 
 69. Id. ¶¶ 1-4. 
 70. Id. ¶¶ 2, 194. 
 71. Id. ¶ 172. 
 72. Id. 
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ticle 1(1) of the Convention to “ ‘ensure’ the free and full exercise of 
the rights” of its citizens.73 By failing to take sufficient action to pro-
tect citizens’ rights, the state failed to exercise its duty of due dili-
gence.74 Though the court was not in a position to extend that respon-
sibility to the international community, by developing the “due dili-
gence principle” it opened the door to finding a state responsible for 
its failure to protect those within its borders,75 and therein laid a 
brick in the foundation of RTP. 
 The RTP doctrine first emerged under its now acronym-worthy 
title in 2001.76 Between 2000 and 2001, the International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) conducted multi-
national meetings around the world to determine the “global political 
consensus” on the relationship between sovereignty and humanitar-
ian intervention.77 Participants formed the Commission to respond to 
then Secretary-General Annan’s call to determine how the interna-
tional community should react to mass atrocities such as Rwanda.78 
The Canadian government spearheaded the meetings that yielded 
the Commission’s 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect.79 While, 
as discussed infra, the U.N. followed its own course in recognizing 
and defining RTP, a thorough understanding of the ICISS conception 
of the doctrine is important as it provided the foundation for the U.N. 
and gave guidance on structuring and implementing the doctrine. 
 Within its report, the ICISS articulates the guiding principles, le-
gal foundations, and doctrinal outlines of the RTP.80 The core concept 
the Commission advances is that a state’s sovereignty carries with it 
the responsibility to protect the people within the state.81 When a 
state fails in its duty through either inability or deliberate inaction, 
sovereignty and its sister “principle of non-intervention [must] yield[] 
to the international responsibility to protect”—shifting the responsi-
bility to protect to the international community.82 This foundational 
concept—that the state owes a duty to its citizens, the neglect or 
                                                 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 165-66. 
 74. Id. ¶¶ 165-75. 
 75. See Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law 
8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 81, 81-82, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156773. 
 76. See generally ICISS REPORT, supra note 13. 
 77. Id. paras. 1.7-1.9. 
 78. Id. at vii. 
 79. Id. at vii, paras. 1.7-1.9. Commentators note that the September 10, 2001 release 
of the report, merely one day before the World Trade Center attacks, contributed to delays 
in discussion of the doctrine following the release of the report. See, e.g., LEE FEINSTEIN, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR No. 22, DARFUR AND BEYOND: WHAT IS NEEDED TO 
PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES 8 (2007). 
 80. See generally ICISS REPORT, supra note 13. 
 81. Id. at xi. 
 82. Id. 
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flouting of which opens the door to international intervention—is the 
core of RTP. 
 The Commission grounds its reconceptualization of sovereignty in 
three sources.83 First, the reconceptualization is grounded in the con-
cept of sovereignty itself, which, by its definition, places responsibility 
for the internal affairs of a state within the hands of that state.84 Sec-
ond, the ICISS grounds its conception of sovereignty in states’ exist-
ing legal obligations in international law, asserting “state sovereignty 
. . . cannot be an excuse for . . . non-performance”85 of existing human 
rights and international law obligations.86 Third, the Commission looks 
to the discourse and action of states and international organizations, 
which support defining sovereignty as responsibility.87 
 The Commission builds upon the concept of sovereignty as respon-
sibility to further define RTP. The ICISS articulates the triggering 
conditions for RTP, which it terms the “Just Cause Threshold.”88 To 
justify military intervention under RTP, the ICISS requires that: 
serious and irreparable harm [is] occurring to human beings, or 
[is] imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with geno-
cidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate 
state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state 
situation; or 
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, 
whether carried out by killing, force expulsion, acts of terror 
or rape.89 
Thus, the ICISS does not define the triggers of RTP through the lan-
guage of international criminal and human rights law. It eschews 
terms such as genocide or crimes against humanity—though the 
Commission understands these thresholds to be inclusive of many 
such crimes—in favor of more discretionary, descriptive guidelines.90 
This stands in marked contrast to the U.N.’s reports and resolutions 
that name specific crimes that trigger RTP. 
 Integral to the ICISS’s conception of RTP are three component re-
sponsibilities which combine to form the responsibility to protect: the 
“responsibility to prevent,” “responsibility to react,” and the “respon-
                                                 
 83. See id. 
 84. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 6 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS 
RESEARCH]; see also ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi. 
 85. ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84, at 7. 
 86. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi; ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84, at 7. 
 87. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi; ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84, at 10-12. 
 88. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii. 
 89. Id. at xii. 
 90. Id. paras. 4.21-4.25.  
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sibility to rebuild.”91 The Commission places distinct and strong em-
phasis on the primacy of prevention of conditions of widespread kill-
ing and rights abuses.92 While the duties nations have to aid in pre-
vention could easily be the substance of a discussion of RTP, the fo-
cus of this paper is on the use of military intervention under the re-
sponsibility-to-react division of responsibility to protect.93 As such, 
readers should simply note that the focus of responsibility to protect 
is not solely upon justifying military intervention, but rather has a 
more comprehensive scope.  
 Importantly, the ICISS further outlines specific conditions under 
which the international community can invoke RTP to justify mili-
tary intervention. As an examination of U.N. action regarding RTP 
will show, though the U.N. did not wholesale adopt the ICISS condi-
tions, the Committee’s recommendations are integral to a discussion 
of how to advance RTP. In addition to articulating the just cause 
threshold that must be met before RTP is triggered, the Commission 
articulates four “[p]recautionary principles”94: “[r]ight intention,” 
“last resort,” “proportional means,” and “reasonable prospects.”95 The 
Commission envisions the principles as necessarily strong limits 
placed upon military intervention to ensure against abuse and to fur-
ther clarify when the international community may address a crisis 
through the extreme tactic of military intervention.96  
 Each principle addresses common critiques of a doctrine that justi-
fies intervention. Though right intention does not preclude states 
having mixed-motives in their desire to intervene, it requires that the 
“primary purpose . . . be to halt or avert human suffering;” thereby 
addressing the concern that RTP could become a tool used by those 
with less laudable intentions.97 The last resort principle ensures that 
all peaceful or non-military coercive measures be attempted or con-
sidered prior to use of military intervention;98 precluding action by 
those who would move first to military intervention. This principle 
does, however, permit the deliberating nations to consider but not 
                                                 
 91. Id. at xi.  
 92. Id. (“Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to 
protect.”) (emphasis omitted). Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at xii.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. para. 4.32 (“When both these and the threshold ‘just cause’ principle are taken 
together . . . the Commission believes that they will strictly limit the use of coercive mili-
tary force for human protection purposes. Our purpose is not to license aggression with fine 
words, or to provide strong states with new rationales for doubtful strategic designs, but to 
strengthen the order of states by providing for clear guidelines to guide concerted inter-
national action in those exceptional circumstances when violence within a state menaces 
all peoples.”).  
 97. Id. at xii. 
 98. Id. 
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ultimately employ a given peaceful tactic, if there exists “reasonable 
grounds for believing . . . [said tactics] would not have succeeded.”99 
Proportional means requires that the military intervention be the 
“minimum necessary” to address the conflict.100 By mandating the 
minimum intervention necessary, this principle speaks to concerns 
that RTP will end in drawn-out and costly foreign occupations.101 
Lastly, the reasonable prospect principle mitigates against ill-
conceived interventions as it requires there to be, at the time of mak-
ing the decision to intervene, a “reasonable chance of success” of the 
intervention.102 The role of these four principles in addressing com-
mon concerns regarding any doctrine permitting intervention and in 
structuring comprehensive framework for RTP as a doctrine is dis-
cussed in detail later.  
 The aforementioned principles delimit the doctrine but do not ad-
dress who determines whether such principles are satisfied. The 
Commission views the U.N. Security Council as holding primary re-
sponsibility for implementing RTP.103 Vesting this power in the Secu-
rity Council recognizes the Council’s powers to address issues of in-
ternational security under Articles 24 and 39-42 of the U.N. Char-
ter.104 Doing so also accomplishes the goal of ensuring that any inter-
vention is a multilateral, rather than unilateral, action which links 
back to the precautionary principle of right intention, as no one na-
tion’s desire determines whether an intervention proceeds.105 Under 
Article 99, the ICISS recommends the Secretary-General or the Secu-
rity Council authorize independent investigations into a crisis to de-
termine if the situation meets the triggering conditions and princi-
ples.106 In addition to the results of such inquiries, the Security Coun-
cil should consider regular reports of both U.N. agencies and 
NGOs.107 The ICISS goes so far as to recognize alternative avenues of 
intervention should the Security Council fail to act on such informa-
tion, including emergency action by the General Assembly or extra-
U.N. action (either multi- or unilateral), though it disfavors these op-
tions.108 All the recommendations of this Note require the Security 
                                                 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. For a discussion of why such principles should guide any intervention doctrine, 
see Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental 
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 232, 
245-72 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane, eds., 2003). 
 102. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.  
 103. Id. at xii, paras. 6.2-6.3. 
 104. Id. paras. 6.3, 6.16.  
 105. Id. at xii, para. 6.12.  
 106. Id. paras. 4.29-4.31. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at xii-xiii (“The Security Council should take into account . . . that, if it fails to 
discharge its responsibility to protect . . . concerned states may not rule out other means 
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Council to act as the authorizing agent for RTP. Therefore this Note 
does not examine these alternative avenues in detail. 
B.   RTP at the U.N. 
 Since 2000, both the United Nations General Assembly and the 
Security Council have developed an increasingly well-defined under-
standing of RTP. Then Secretary-General Annan laid the foundation for 
recognizing the doctrine in a 2000 report. In that report, Annan un-
equivocally puts a powerful question before the international commu-
nity: 
I . . . accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference 
offer vital protection to small and weak states. But to critics I 
would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, 
an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to 
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?109   
Annan goes on to specifically challenge sovereignty, stating: “surely 
no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes 
against humanity.”110 In closing, the Secretary-General then recog-
nizes the Security Council’s “moral duty to act on behalf of the inter-
national community” when other attempts to stop atrocities fail.111 
Members of the ICISS formed the Commission and drafted its foun-
dational report on RTP doctrine as a response to “compelling 
pleas.”112 The 2000 report, however, was only the beginning of discus-
sion of RTP at the U.N.  
 The General Assembly built upon Annan’s first plea and the sub-
sequent ICISS report in two crucial reports in 2004 and 2005: A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility and In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.113 In the 
2004 report, the General Assembly does not adopt specific language 
defining RTP.114 However, the report makes two crucial contributions 
                                                                                                                  
[to intervention] . . . and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may 
suffer thereby.”). 
 109. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32, ¶ 217. 
 110. Id. ¶ 219. 
 111. Id.  
 112. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at vii. 
 113. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All, delivered to the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc A/59/2005 (Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, In Lar-
ger Freedom]; U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶¶ 
199-203, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/59/565 
(Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World].  
 114.  See generally U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World, supra note 113, ¶¶ 
199-203. Rather than adopting specific language, the report states that: “We endorse the 
emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable 
by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of 
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to RTP doctrine. First, the report affirms the doctrine as an “emerg-
ing norm,”115 thereby increasing the doctrine’s credibility in the in-
ternational community. Second, the report grounds the doctrine in 
the existing obligation states possess under the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.116 The respon-
sibility States have under the Convention requires that the “principle 
of non-intervention”117 yield to the “ ‘responsibility to protect’ of every 
State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastro-
phe.”118 By finding a basis for RTP in already existing obligations, the 
G.A. report further reinforces RTP as a valid development in interna-
tional law, rather than a figment of its imagination. 
 The 2005 report builds upon this foundation. In this report, the 
Secretary-General expressly asks heads of state to “[e]mbrace the 
‘responsibility to protect’ as a basis for collective action against geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and [to] agree to 
act on this responsibility . . . .”119 Thus, the Secretary-General asks 
nations to not only recognize the principle of RTP but to recognize it 
as a doctrine that requires action, rather than merely an aspirational 
principle. Taken together, the General Assembly’s reports of 2004 
and 2005 culminated in the General Assembly Resolution 2005 World 
Summit Outcome.  
 The 2005 World Summit Outcome provides the definition of RTP 
the U.N. General Assembly adopted at the close of discussion on 
RTP. The actual language the General Assembly adopted in its reso-
lution is as follows: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in ac-
cordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, 
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and sup-
port the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.  
139. The international community, through the United Nations, 
also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humani-
tarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from geno-
                                                                                                                  
genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing, or serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling 
to prevent.” Id. ¶ 203. 
 115. Id. ¶ 203. 
 116. Id. ¶ 200 (“Under the . . . [Genocide Convention], States have agreed that genocide 
. . . is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.”). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. ¶ 201. 
 119. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 113, Annex, ¶ 7(a)- (b) 
(emphasis added). 
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cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 
this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appro-
priate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authori-
ties are manifestly failing to protect their populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consid-
eration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and in-
ternational law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary 
and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under 
stress before crises and conflicts break out.120  
 The language the General Assembly adopts narrows the ICISS’s 
proposed definition in two important ways. Recall that the ICISS de-
fines the triggering crimes for RTP as “large scale loss of life or large 
scale ‘ethnic cleansing.’ ”121 The U.N. is more specific, identifying four 
triggering crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.122 Additionally, the U.N. places the duty to exer-
cise RTP exclusively in the hands of the Security Council.123 This de-
cision contrasts with the ICISS proposal, which allows for action 
through the General Assembly or multinational organizations.124 
These changes are critical to constructing an RTP that is sufficiently 
broad to be effective, but also narrow enough that nations will agree 
to be bound by the doctrine.  
 The 2005 World Summit Outcome defines RTP for the interna-
tional community. Subsequent U.N. action further elucidated the 
boundaries of the doctrine and strengthened the international com-
munity’s commitment to RTP. In two separate resolutions, the Secu-
rity Council reaffirmed its recognition of and commitment to advanc-
ing the doctrine.125 At a 2008 Berlin conference on responsible sover-
eignty, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized the continued 
importance of implementing RTP, which he characterized as “narrow 
                                                 
 120. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/1 
(Oct. 24, 2005) (emphasis added). 
 121. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.  
 122. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 138 (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. ¶ 139. 
 124. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xiii; see also Pace & Deller, supra note 25, at 29. 
 125. S.C. Res. 1894, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
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but deep.”126 Finally and most recently, the Secretary-General issued 
the 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.127 Princi-
pally, this document calls for the U.N. to shift from discussing the 
boundaries of RTP to developing the U.N. “strategy, standards, proc-
esses, tools and practices for the responsibility to protect.”128 The Sec-
retary-General understands that it is time to determine the future of 
RTP, as should the international community.  
 U.N. documents from 2000-2009 chronicle the development of RTP 
doctrine, define its boundaries, and underscore the importance of the 
international community committing to RTP. The U.N. has left us 
with a call to determine how to implement RTP,129 a call that mirrors 
the plea Annan made in 2000 for the international community to 
construct an intervention doctrine.130 The proposals of this Note an-
swer that call by recommending how the U.N. can build upon its ex-
isting conception of RTP to create a doctrine that should become 
binding international law. 
IV.   MOVING FORWARD WITH RTP 
 RTP is a young doctrine, having only entered into international 
discussion under that title in 2001. No binding U.N. resolution has 
focused on it, though the U.N. has a well-developed framework for 
the doctrine. No states have drafted international treaties regarding 
its contents and applicability.131 As such, the doctrine still has room 
to breathe, to evolve, and, where necessary, to expand. What follows 
is a discussion of how to proceed in crafting an RTP that is robust 
and broad enough to honor the doctrine’s fundamental goal of protecting 
vulnerable persons, while also being sufficiently narrow and well-
conceived to appease critics of a doctrine which requires intervention.  
 As the doctrine currently rests, it successfully removes one of the 
blocks to intervention: the non-intervention norm. Where countries 
could previously cloak their inaction in the concept of non-
intervention,132 RTP eradicates that pre-textual block to intervention 
by requiring the international community to intervene in the face of 
certain atrocities.133 While this is a decisive step forward, it is not suf-
ficient. As a non-binding norm, RTP does little to address the second, 
                                                 
 126. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ at Berlin Event, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/11701 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Secre-
tary-General, Secretary-General Defends]. 
 127. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33. 
 128. Id. at summary. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32, ¶¶ 217-19. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 109-30. 
 132. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx. 
 133. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶¶ 138-39. 
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and perhaps most fatal block to intervention: lack of political will.134 
History shows us that the international community’s failure to act “in 
response to each of the major genocides of the twentieth century 
[was] not the accidental product[] of neglect[,] [but rather a] concrete 
choice[] made by the world’s most influential decision makers after 
implicit and explicit weighing of costs and benefits.”135 Absent a re-
quirement to act, selfishness will defeat idealism and atrocities will 
continue.136 A binding RTP can enter the fight on the side of idealism. 
Existing scholarship on RTP, combined with aspects of the U.N. and 
ICISS’s conceptions of the doctrine, provide a roadmap for articulat-
ing a binding doctrine. 
 At this juncture in the development of international law and RTP, 
the Security Council must control the implementation of RTP. 
Though the ICISS proposal permits extra-Security Council action, 
this option takes RTP too far outside the current structure of inter-
national law.137 Per the language of the U.N. Charter, the U.N., as a 
collectivity “maintain[s] international peace and security” and serves 
as a “center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment 
of . . . common ends.”138 As such, this proposal advances RTP in line 
with U.N. interpretations of the doctrine which place authority in the 
hands of the Security Council.139 
 Though the focus of his critique of RTP is the failure of the inter-
national community to develop the preventative aspect of the doc-
trine, Hitoshi Nasu provides a helpful framework for considering the 
principle areas of RTP which require further development: the 
“scope, stage, and strength” of the doctrine.140 “Scope” encompasses 
which crimes/actions in a conflict will trigger RTP.141 “Stage” refers to 
when the duty to protect becomes that of the international community 
or, stated differently, when the “sovereign state” has failed to fulfill 
its RTP.142 Lastly, “strength” embraces the level and “choice of methods” 
                                                 
 134. See U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, supra note 126 (“Today 
the responsibility to protect is a concept, not yet a policy; an aspiration, not yet a reality.”). 
But see Pace & Deller, supra note 25, at 20 (“Meeting the criteria would encourage action 
where political will is otherwise lacking or is obstructed by one country’s strategic interests.”).  
 135. Power, supra note 35, at 256. 
 136. BASS, supra note 38, at 8. 
 137. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xiii; see also ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84, 
at 7 (identifying the U.N. as the “principle institution for . . . using the authority of the 
international community.”). 
 138. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, 4. 
 139. See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 139. 
 140. Hitoshi Nasu, Operationalizing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and Conflict Preven-
tion: Dilemmas of Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, 14 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 
209, 213 (2009). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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of intervention permissible in a given conflict.143 The scope and stage 
elements of RTP form the primary focus for the following discussion.  
 Defining both the scope and stage is critical to articulating a more 
complete doctrine by better conceptualizing the triggering conditions 
for international intervention. Scope speaks to what types of conflict 
or which on the ground situations fall within the bounds of RTP. As-
suming the conflict falls within the scope of RTP, when is it eligible 
for international action or intervention? Defining what it means for a 
state to have failed in its responsibility to protect, either through de-
liberate inaction or inability, delimits the stage and therein ad-
dresses this concern.  
 While the ICISS report first defined RTP, the U.N. reports and 
resolutions on the doctrine better define its scope. Recall that the 
U.N. 2005 World Summit Outcome names the four crimes, which 
trigger RTP: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.144 Four triggering crimes, as opposed to the discre-
tionary categories of “large scale loss of life or large scale ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ ”145 which the ICISS report proposes. By limiting RTP’s 
application to only these four crimes, the U.N. limits the scope of the 
doctrine. This limitation significantly narrows which factual scenar-
ios can trigger RTP which, in turn, undermines concerns that the 
doctrine will be used to intervene in any situation the international 
community desires. Logically, increased specificity of the triggering 
factual scenarios decreases the margin for abuse of the doctrine.146  
 To further narrow the scope of RTP, a doctrine must go beyond the 
definition adopted by the U.N. Definitions of the four triggering 
crimes appear in, the Rome Statute, Genocide Convention and Secu-
rity Council Resolutions establishing the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as precedent of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).147 Any resolution or treaty creating a binding RTP must explic-
itly limit the scope of the four triggering crimes to their definitions in 
current international law. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon states 
in his 2009 report, “the best way to discourage States or groups of 
                                                 
 143. Id. 
 144. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 138 (emphasis added). 
 145. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.  
 146. See U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, supra note 126 (“Like-
wise, if United Nations rules procedures and practices are developed . . . there is less like-
lihood of RTP principles being used to justify extra-legal interventions for other pur-
poses.”). Id. 
 147. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. (defining crime against humanity: “For the purpose of this Statute, 
‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination . . . .”). 
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States from misusing [RTP] for inappropriate purposes would be to 
develop fully” the doctrine and guidelines for implementation.148 By 
limiting the scope of the doctrine to four trigger crimes, the 2005 
World Summit resolution takes a step toward that goal. This pro-
posal for a binding RTP takes that task a step further by explicitly 
incorporating current international law definitions of the trigger 
crimes and thereby decreasing the potential for abuse of RTP.  
 Having further narrowed the scope of RTP, it is necessary to shift 
to defining the stage for RTP. Here again, the U.N. resolution on RTP 
productively narrows the definition while protecting the efficacy of 
the doctrine. Recall that if the ICISS found a state “unwilling or un-
able” to prevent or stop a crisis, it considered RTP to come into ef-
fect.149 The U.N. increases this threshold requirement as it mandates 
that a state be “manifestly failing to protect [its] population[] from” 
the four triggering crimes.150 Manifestly failing is markedly stronger 
language than unable or unwilling. Consequently, it narrows the 
stage on which the international community will have to perform its 
responsibility to protect. This stronger language brings the stage re-
quirement into line with the narrower scope of crimes that trigger 
RTP which the U.N. adopted and which this Note supports. Narrower 
scope and stage requirements will make RTP more palatable to skep-
tical states, as the more refined the trigger conditions, the more lim-
ited is RTP; for example, there will be fewer situations which will 
trigger the doctrine and therefore fewer interventions to which a 
state must commit. Simultaneously, though these requirements nar-
row RTP, they do not dilute it; the doctrine remains strong enough to 
require intervention in the worst atrocities. 
 While the U.N. language productively narrows RTP’s stage, it does 
little to clarify how to determine the level of state inaction that con-
stitutes a manifest failure. Recall that this Note endorses the ICISS 
proposal that the Security Council utilize independent inquiries into 
a crisis to evaluate the presence of RTP trigger factors. Most scholars 
recognize that insufficient intelligence is no longer the principle chal-
lenge in intervention cases.151 Rather, in the era of high-speed com-
munication, “it is much harder to kill [people] in secret.”152 In keeping 
with that reality, this Note proposes that if a Security Council in-
quiry into a crisis establishes evidence of a triggering crime in the 
state in question, that finding creates a rebuttable presumption that 
                                                 
 148. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33, at summary.  
 149. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi. 
 150. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 139. 
 151. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 37, at 354-55 (describing the intelligence missions 
and reports the U.S. directed and drafted regarding Rwanda); see also U.N. Secretary-
General, Implementing, supra note 33, ¶ 6 (noting that there were “warning signs” for each 
of recent history’s “worst human tragedies”). 
 152. Walzer, supra note 62, at 19. 
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the state is manifestly failing to address the crisis. Any state that 
opposes intervention would then have to definitively establish the 
falsity of the presumption. This proposal links the high standards for 
the scope and stage of RTP in a logical manner—the evidence of an 
atrocity tends to prove that the state responsible to prevent it has 
failed to do so—while providing a safety valve should the facts not, in 
reality, require intervention. As such, the proposed conception of RTP 
again strikes a balance between appeasing reluctant states and 
maintaining the strength of the doctrine.  
 In addition to embracing language to refine the scope and stage of 
RTP, a binding conceptualization of RTP should adopt all of the pro-
posed ICISS precautionary principles: “[r]ight intention,” “last re-
sort,” “proportional means,” and “reasonable prospects.”153 Each prin-
ciple reinforces the inherent nature of intervention under RTP as a 
humanitarian endeavor.154 The ICISS proposes, however, that the 
principles form part of a threshold evidentiary requirement that the 
Security Council must establish before intervening.155 As threshold 
evidentiary requirements, the principles are too unwieldy. The Secu-
rity Council can look to international treaties and case law to deter-
mine if a given situation satisfies, for example, the definition of geno-
cide and therein triggers RTP. There are no similar sources for these 
precautionary principles. Thus, rather than evidentiary require-
ments, the proposed conceptualization of RTP adopts the principles 
as policy guidelines, conceptual checkpoints the Security Council 
should look to as it evaluates an intervention strategy once it has es-
tablished that a triggering crime is occurring. Keeping the principles 
as policy guidelines advances the goals of the ICISS in drafting 
them,156 without adding an amorphous and highly discretionary step 
to the process of determining whether a situation triggers RTP. 
 The final proposal of this Note shifts attention from definitions of 
RTP and which factual patterns trigger international intervention to 
the issue of the Security Council veto power. Many scholars and pro-
ponents of RTP call for the five permanent members of the Security 
Council to forego their veto power when considering intervention un-
der RTP.157 In his report on implementing RTP, Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-Moon speaks on the solemn responsibility of the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council:  
                                                 
 153. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.  
 154. Id. para. 4.32. For a full discussion of the principles, see supra text accompanying 
notes 94-102. 
 155. Id. paras. 4.28-4.32. 
 156. Id. para. 4.32. (identifying the role of the principles in shaping policy of RTP). 
 157. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33, ¶ 61; Amnesty 
Int’l, supra note 36. 
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[T]he Secretary-General bears particular responsibility for ensur-
ing that the international community responds in a ‘timely and de-
cisive’ manner, as called for in paragraph 139 of the Summit Out-
come. . . . Within the Security-Council, the five permanent mem-
bers bear particular responsibility because of the privileges of ten-
ure and the veto power they have been granted under the Charter. 
I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to em-
ploy the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations 
relating to the responsibility to protect . . . and to reach a mutual 
understanding to that effect.158 
The Secretary-General both draws attention to the gravity of the veto 
power, as well as calls upon the permanent members to “reach a mutual 
understanding” that they ought to forego that power in the RTP con-
text.159 At the proposal of a representative of one of the five permanent 
members, the ICISS endorsed a similar concept of “constructive ab-
stention” of a state’s veto power in “matters where [that state’s] vital 
national interests were not claimed to be involved.”160 While such 
proposals are constructive, they are insufficient as they leave RTP to 
the whim of the political will and self-interest of five nations. 
 Per Article 23 of the U.N. Charter, the U.S., the U.K., France, 
China and Russia sit as the permanent members of the Security 
Council.161 In its current form, the veto power permits any one of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council to determine the 
action or inaction of the Council; should one permanent member ob-
ject to an action, the Council cannot proceed.162 In recent years, China 
has used the veto power to cripple Security Council action in Dar-
fur163 due, at least in part, to its economic interests in Sudan and Su-
danese oil.164 Many policymakers call for general reform of the veto 
power, labeling it “the greatest flaw in the U.N.’s constitutional edi-
fice.”165 This paper calls not for a sweeping reform of the veto power, 
but rather a reform which pertains only to its exercise in situations 
which trigger RTP. 
 To fully address the challenge of overcoming the veto power of the 
five permanent members of the Security Council, RTP must include a 
binding provision which overrides that power once a situation trig-
gers the doctrine. The ICISS proposal calls for voluntary, construc-
tive abstention of the veto power by the permanent members when 
                                                 
 158. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33, ¶ 61 (emphasis omitted). 
 159. Id.  
 160. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, para. 6.21. 
 161. U.N. Charter, art. 23. 
 162. NIGEL D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
140 (2002). 
 163. Feinstein, supra note 79, at 13. 
 164. See Press Release, Human Rights First, China’s Oil Interests in Sudan Fueling Darfur 
Violence, Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://www.commondreams.org/news2008/0312-04.htm. 
 165. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 162, at 303. 
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there was a majority in favor of intervention.166 Rather than a non-
binding mutual agreement, the existence of a majority in support of 
intervention must trigger a binding requirement that no member of 
the permanent five use its veto power. To trigger the prohibition of 
the veto, however, the majority in favor of intervention must be a 
“majority +”—meaning it must include one or more members of the 
Security Council. The doctrine should, however, draw upon the ICISS 
proposal to provide an escape valve. Should a nation’s “vital state in-
terests”167 be threatened, that member could exercise her veto power, 
regardless of the existence of a “majority +” rule.  
 The proposed reform to the veto power has two advantages: one 
moral and one practical. First, creating a binding bar to the veto 
power precludes the “unconscionable [reality] that one veto can over-
ride the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian con-
cern.”168 Second, a limited, context-specific reform of the veto power 
may be more palatable to the permanent five than would a sweeping 
overhaul of the system. Requiring at least one member of the perma-
nent five to be within the majority ensures that the will of the non-
permanent members cannot wholly override that of the permanent 
five, a concession to the controlling status of the permanent five. At 
least one permanent member of the Security Council supported an 
agreement by the five to refrain from use of the veto power within 
RTP context, which suggests that there may be a foundation of sup-
port upon which to build in order to create a binding provision.169 
Though they recognize it as an “uphill battle,” activists have identi-
fied both the U.K. and France as likely the most open to reform of the 
veto.170 Getting the permanent members of the Security Council to 
sign onto a document which, however limited in scope, reforms their 
veto power, is inevitably an uphill battle. It is, however, a battle 
worth fighting because absent such a reform, RTP will be a markedly 
weaker doctrine.171 
 
                                                 
 166. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xiii.  
 167. Id. para. 8.29(2). 
 168. Id. para. 6.20 (highlighting the profound detrimental impact of the veto power in 
human rights crises). 
 169. See id. para. 6.21. But see, HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (R2P): MOVING THE CAMPAIGN FORWARD 54 (2007) (“[I]n general, P5 members 
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veto shall be exercised.”), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/R2P-
Final-Report.pdf. 
 170. HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, supra note 169, at 56. 
 171. See id. at 52-54 (“The use of the veto by P5 members has hindered the Security 
Council’s ability to respond to conflict situations where mass atrocities, including genocide 
and crimes against humanity, are being committed.”). 
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A.   Why Nations Should Adopt a Binding RTP 
 Proponents of the slow evolution of international law argue 
against a deliberate attempt to define the bounds of a doctrine in fa-
vor of an “incremental development of normative consensus.”172 Such 
critics fail to give full credit to the support and consensus RTP has 
already garnered. RTP already stands upon solid ground. The 2005 
World Summit recognized the norm in “language . . . sufficiently 
strong to be considered an endorsement of a new set of principles”173:  
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in ac-
cordance with it.174  
Since 2005, the U.N. has only strengthened its commitment to RTP 
through repeated reports and resolutions which affirm and further 
refine the doctrine.175 The Secretary-General has shifted focus to im-
plementing the RTP doctrine.176 The proposals of this Note further 
delimit and define RTP, framing it in accordance with Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s conception of it providing “deep,” significant 
protections in “narrow” circumstances.177 We have a principle; now 
we must move forward with it. 
 First and perhaps most urgently, states should accede to a binding 
RTP because the lives of thousands if not millions of individuals hang 
in the balance. How the international community reacts to a future 
Rwanda could be determinative of whether thousands live or die. 
“[T]he last decade of the twentieth century was one of the most dead-
ly in the grimmest century on record”;178 without a binding norm, the 
world is free to watch as other people die. The sheer moral force of 
what is at stake—thousands of human lives—puts a thumb on the 
scale of solidifying RTP doctrine into a binding principle of interna-
tional law. At its inception, the Nuremberg Tribunal was unprece-
dented.179 The profound human suffering of the Holocaust incensed 
the international community, driving it to create a new institution to 
hold responsible the perpetrators of the atrocities.180 If states accede 
                                                 
 172. Stromseth, supra note 101, at 245 (emphasis omitted). 
 173. Pace & Deller, supra note 25, at 27. 
 174. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 138 (emphasis added). 
 175. See, e.g., S.C. 1894, supra note 125, pmbl.; U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, 
supra note 33. 
 176. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33. 
 177. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, supra note 126. 
 178. Power, supra note 35, at 251. 
 179. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxii. 
 180. Id. 
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to a binding RTP, they advance international law in the same vein as 
the creation of Nuremberg; unprecedented as it was, the tribunal was 
also an unquestionable good. Annan knew in 2000 that nations have 
a “moral duty” to protect their brethren.181 Now, those nations must 
honor their idealism over self-interest and accept that this duty com-
pels them to accept RTP as a binding precept.182 
 Over and above the moral duty that compels action, existing obli-
gations under international law support the proposition that states 
must intervene to prevent atrocities and should do so through RTP. 
The Genocide Convention provides the clearest example of this exist-
ing obligation. The Convention defines genocide and states, in Article 
1: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether commit-
ted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international 
law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”183 One hundred 
and forty-one nations acceded to the treaty and are thus bound by its 
substance.184 By grounding RTP in these nations’ existing duty to 
prevent genocide, the 2004 and 2009 General Assembly reports 
strengthen the argument that RTP is simply an articulation of prin-
ciples that already bind states to intervene in the face of atrocities.185 
As such, nations should accede to a binding treaty or support a reso-
lution on RTP as an affirmation of their existing obligations under 
international law. 
 In 2007, the International Court of Justice strengthened the link 
between RTP and an existing obligation to prevent genocide under 
the Genocide Convention.186 The case addressed Serbia and Montene-
gro’s liability for genocide against citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in the early 1990s.187 By analyzing the plain language of the Conven-
tion, the court identified the responsibilities to prevent and to punish 
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genocide as “two distinct yet connected obligations.”188 While the 
court recognized how closely related the two principles are, it firmly 
stated “it is not the case that the obligation to prevent has no sepa-
rate legal existence of its own.”189 Rather, the duty to prevent “is one 
of conduct [meaning] that a State cannot be under an obligation to 
succeed . . . the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all 
means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far 
is possible.”190 Though the court did not expressly discuss RTP, its 
decision supports the link between RTP and existing obligations un-
der the Genocide Convention by finding a duty to act in the Conven-
tion’s language of prevention. RTP advances the duty to act embodied 
in the Genocide Convention and similar treaties by synthesizing their 
content to create a unified principle which requires the international 
community to intervene in the face of the worst human crises: geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 
V.   FULFILLING PROMISES: CONCLUSION 
 Those who hesitate to recognize a binding RTP may challenge that 
it is sufficient as an aspirational doctrine. After all, as little as ten 
years ago, no one was even discussing the responsibility to protect as 
such. While scholar Gary Bass writes on the problem of placing too 
much faith in international tribunals, his observation applies to plac-
ing too much faith in an aspirational principle:  
The idea that all international problems will dissolve with the es-
tablishment of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction 
is an invitation to political indolence. It allows one to make no al-
terations in domestic political action and thought, to change no at-
titudes, to try no new approaches and yet to appear to be working 
for peace.191 
A non-binding RTP is just that: a commitment a nation can make, 
give itself a pat on the back, and then continue on with the status 
quo. That possibility is unacceptable. The stakes are too high. Too 
many lives are at risk. 
 In its current form, RTP gets the international community over 
the hurdle of the non-intervention norm, but that feat alone is not 
enough. History and scholarship on intervention teach us that, more 
often then not, nations lack the political will to intervene to save the 
lives of strangers.192 This Note proposes that nations adopt a binding 
RTP that is an amalgamation of U.N. and ICISS definitions of the 
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doctrine, as well as scholarship on intervention and reforming the 
veto power. Mustering the necessary political will to bind themselves 
to RTP requires nations to critically examine their existing obliga-
tions under the Genocide Convention and other major international 
treaties, alongside the compelling moral arguments in favor of inter-
vention. Upon doing so, nations must inevitably realize they have 
already made the commitment to act. RTP stands ready to advance 
the language and spirit of international human rights and humani-
tarian law—it is simply waiting for the international community to 
fulfill its promises. 
 
